Regulatory Capture

When the agencies meant to regulate an industry instead serve that industry’s interests. Select an agency to see its leaders, their industry connections, and evidence of capture.

237

Agencies

Officials tracked

Industry ties

126

Dismissed actions

Select agency

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

Federal agency. Imported from federalregister.gov (slug: advisory-council-on-historic-preservation).

No officials tracked for this agency yet.

Agency leader data is being added across all sectors.

All tracked agencies

Indicators tracked

Revolving door

Former industry executives in agency leadership, and former regulators moving to industry positions

Enforcement decline

Reduced enforcement actions, dismissed cases, deferred prosecution agreements, and declining fine amounts

Industry funding

Campaign contributions from regulated entities to legislators who oversee the agency

Advisory capture

Industry representatives dominating advisory committees and public comment processes

What is regulatory capture

Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of the industry it is charged with regulating. The concept was formalized by economist George Stigler in his 1971 paper “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” for which he later received the Nobel Prize.

The academic literature identifies several predictable consequences of capture. Enforcement actions decline in frequency and severity. Rule-making increasingly favors incumbent firms over new entrants and consumers. Personnel move freely between the regulator and the regulated (the “revolving door”). Industry representatives dominate advisory panels and public comment processes.

Regulatory Capture

All tracked agencies

Indicators tracked

What is regulatory capture

Further reading